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Introduction 
One of the features of post-cold war thinking about peace support 
operations has been the perception of dysfunctional gaps between sets 
of criteria: requirements, intentions and performance. Attempting to get 
a better fit, so that intentions, requirements and performance are well-
matched has been a basic motive behind prescriptive analysis in general 
and doctrine development in particular. This paper acknowledges that 
doctrine is not dogma. Indeed dogma is hardly a viable end-state in a 
world where the practice of peace support is in such a state of flux. 
Doctrine has the function of a guidebook, a point of reference rather 
than a blueprint. However, to be of any value it also has to define terms 
and principles. In this and other respects it therefore serves as an 
indicator of an evolving military discourse. The argument here is that if 
new peace support operations are to be as formative as old 
peacekeeping operations, it is important to examine some of the 
implications of ne~ doctrine. Doctrinal development has been 
particularly advanced in the United Kingdom, and can be said to 
amount to a British capture of the international debate in the mid-
1990s, reflected in two Army Field Manuals Wider Peacekeeping 
(hereafter AFM WP) and by the first draft of Peace Support 
Operations (hereafter AFM PS0). 1 Particular reference will be made, 
therefore, to UK doctrinal development. 
The analysis begins by highlighting two problems that doctrinal 
developments seek to overcome: "cringe" and "creep". It then 
considers the implicit choices that are presented in tackling them and 
points out the implications of a military spectrum approach to doctrine. 
Although the choices reflected in doctrine may be rational from a 
military point of view, their political acceptability is a critical issue that 
also needs to addressed. 
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Mission Cringe 
Both mission cringe and mission creep have pejorative connotations, but 
cringe is more a matter of rhetoric and perception, since the impact of 
doing nothing is less easily measured than the impact of something done. 
In respect of cringe: one person's abject appeasement is another's life-
saving conflict avoidance. 
Cringe is my own short-hand term for a group of perceived 
inadequacies which give rise to allegations of doing nothing, avoiding the 
issue and appeasing bullies. It suggests that there are discrepancies 
between desirable ends and the means attempted (or not attempted) to 
achieve them. It is primarily a problem at the level of UN mandates,_ 
political will and strategic planning. Without discussing its justification in 
particular cases, accusations of cringe have been directed at political 
leaders who are seen to wash their hands like Pontius Pilate rather than 
divert resources for a peace support operation, appealing to such criteria as 
lack of finance, lack of public support or absence of national interest. Gaps 
between ends and means also arise if the Security Council issues flawed 
mandates or states do not provide the relevant and properly-configured 
forces to fulfil the mandate, leaving soldiers exposed to casualty and 
capture. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was 
highly critical of this k.ind of political "'cowering" in his reports on 
UNPROFOR.2 
Others have blamed the United Nations for sticking to an '·all or nothing 
doctrine", presenting strategists and politicians with the stark options of 
enforcement or consensual peacekeeping.3 Inability to respond 
appropriately to crises has, of course, led to various reforms and 
arrangements for improving information flows~ assessments and decision-
making in the United Nations system. Nevertheless, the United Nations is 
frequently perceived a.S having "too little credibility" in its reactions.4 
Unlike politicians who often seem balked in their search for perfect 
solutions, the military are used to working in imperfect environments, 
inured to living with improvisation and making the best of gaps in 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/1997 7 
resources. Flexibility and initiative with limited resources is especially 
relevant in fluid situations and, as in the Nicosia airport incident in Cyprus 
in 1974, bravura in a position of weakness can sometimes pay off.5 But 
imputations of appeasement or cringe on the part of military commanders 
is often misplaced.6 To support mandates, military commanders are 
furnished with mission statements that indicate what has to be achieved, 
why, when and where. Commanders then estimate the risks and 
responsibilities and in the light of this decide how to implement the mission 
statements. Their estimate or ·•appreciation" is a critical part of the 
planning. It is at this stage that any seeds of under-achievement by military 
forces might be sown. Commanders will have varying styles and cultures 
that may lead them· to appreciate risks and benefits or estimate resources in 
ways that result in under-achievement. But for the most part, peacekeeping 
commanders are constrained in making their estimates by the traditional 
operational concept of peacekeeping- inoffensive posture~ vulnerability a~d 
bluff- thereby limiting the scope for military initiatives. It takes a 
considerable leap of the imagination to envisage General Patton in charge of 
consensual peacekeeping. This ''enforced cringe'' is also liable to produce 
moral dilemmas for peacekeeping forces that have no mandate to go 
beyond self-defence, in the tasks of protecting refugees, for example, and 
that have to abide by highly restrictive rules of engagement (RoE). 
Even if new peace support doctrine allows for less constrained 
parameters in the devising of military appreciations~ thereby opening up 
greater possibilities of military enterprise, it will remain the case that for all 
types of politically-sensitive international operations, military initiatives 
cannot be expected to compensate for 1ack of political will or contradictory 
mandates. Military 'personnel should not be left in the lurch, like the Dutch 
in the Srebrenica enclave in Bosnia in 1995, or be expected to cope with a 
mission impossible.7 It is axiomatic that doctrine should seek to provide an 
element of immunity, to protect military forces from unnecessary danger 
and loss of life. Equally, it is vital that political authorities shoulder the 
responsibility of devising the right kind of mandate, sending the right kind 
of force and providing a political underpinning to the particular concept of 
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operations. In sum, it is doubtful whether peace support operations, of 
whatever type, can be extended to cope with all situations. Nor can a 
change in military doctrine by itself fix the cringe that is essentially the 
product of politics. 
Mission Creep 
The reverse problem,. mission creep or overspill, is the main focus of this 
discussion. Although throughout history armed forces have been diverted 
to undertake functions that were not intended for them, commanders 
would prefer not to rely on improvisation, even when, as in the British 
Army, improvising appears to achieve the status of a virtue. Mission creep 
can, of course, reflect an impetus to seize the initiative and take advantage 
of opportunities for improving security and prospects for peace. Or it may 
reflect the need to carry out an unforseen task (such as repairing 
communications) in order to enable the force to operate at all. In this 
respect mission creep can be organic to the force, growing from within as 
an extension of its competence. By contrast~ externally imposed, 
unintended, unprepared or unplanned escalation, or the extension and 
prolongation of activity, can be as unwelcome in its consequences as 
flinching from tasks. ln the characterisation provided by Daniel and Hayes: 
Jvfission creep occurs when there is an incremental increase in the tasks 
assigned UN .forces to the point that the tasks far exceed initial 
expectations of what the forces had pi armed for and were equipped to 
achieve. 8 
The absence of organic intention, then, is a defining feature of mission 
creep. It can be divided into three basic types: vertical, horizontal and 
temporal. The first two are bound to overlap in certain situations because 
some new tasks, such as the protection of humanitarian aid convoys, may 
entail greater potential use of force than patrolling. 
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Vertical Creep 
In the context of doctrinal development. perhaps the most critical problem 
facing soldiers in the new conflict environments, as presented in Wider 
Peacekeeping, is unintended escalation over the strategic consent divide. 
The manual opens with this issue, and whilst countenancing tactical use of 
force, it cautions against uncontrolled escalation in the strategic use of 
force. 9 
Since the Wider Peacekeeping operational environment is, however, 
likely to be complicated, violent and volatile, the danger of 
inadvertently crossing the consent divide may often be present. In such 
circumstances, there will frequently be temptations to mix the two 
approaches [peacekeeping and enforcement]. Wider Peacekeeping 
doctrine, however, seeks to identify and guard against this danger [my 
emphasis]. 10 
The fVider Peacekeeping manual leaves open the possibility of deliberate 
escalation, by using other types of military forces. This might be depicted 
as having a vertical dimension because force escalation is traditionally 
associated with ladders, a convenient metaphor if cringe is regarded as a 
harmful snake! 
Horizontal Creep 
It seems equally apt to use horizontal imagery for depicting a range of 
Htasks" (used here in the sense of "assigned duty") that cut across military 
combat functions and integrate with non-military activities. Horizontal 
creep is used to mean that soldiers are burdened with multifunctional tasks, 
often of a non-military nature, for which they may be unprepared or ill-
equipped. It was assumed in Wider Peacekeeping that peacekeepers would 
be able to undertake various tasks, from relocating displaced populations to 
apprehending wanted persons. These would require special techniques for 
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which the soldiers would receive training. 11 But critics have pointed out 
that military forces can do more harm than good, and that military 
guardianship of humanitarian assistance and personnel, for example, can 
create as many problems for the independence and impartiality of civilian 
agencies and NGOs as it solves in attempting to provide secure space.l2 
Temporal Creep 
Troop contributing countries have long been aware of, and concerned 
about, the problems of open-ended operations with no exit point. Extending 
the time frame of operations has also been referred to as a form of mission 
creep. 13 UN operations have often started later than originally envisaged, 
and have gone on for longer. Since UNEF I the Security Council has 
insisted on time-bound limits and the Secretary-General has had to justify 
extending the mandate· for additional periods. Strictly speaking, there is an 
element of intention and plannning in these renewable mandates, though 
initial expectations may be that missions will have a limited life. Time 
problems are not fixed by military doctrine but by structures and political 
will. In spite of interesting ideas from Canada and the Netherlands for 
mitigating the problems of deployment delay by improving the UN's rapid 
response capability, and in spite of the availability of rapid response units 
from states such as De~mark, the critical variable in detennining when 
forces are deployed is political decision-making. In fact, as illustrated by 
the difficulty in getting together a peacekeeping force for the Eastern Zaire 
Great Lakes crisis in the last three months of 1996, delays may even 
forestall ill-conceived interventions. However, once states decide to send 
forces, further delays can occur in transport and logistics provision, 
diplomatic clearance and coordination, to the disadvantage of military 
effectiveness. But even the best-prepared operation, arriving on time, can 
get into difficulties as ih Namibia. 14 
Quick-exit strategies have been imposed on operations in advance of 
deployment, as in the decision to deploy a UK logistic support group of 650 
to Angola in 1995, for three months and not a day longer, as well as the 
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better-known example of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. 
Finite limits on participation can have certain advantages. For example, 
they can act as an incentive and reassurance for troop contributing 
countries, and may induce participants in complex emergencies to meet 
deadlines. But they may also put an artificial constraint on dealing with the 
situation. The need for the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR) suggests 
that setting a time limit does not substitute for 1ong-term political solutions. 
It may also reinforce a band-aid or quick-fix mentality. 
The Military Spectrum Approach 
The emerging doctrines of peace support operations in the United 
Kingdom, United States, France, and in NATO, represent a common shift 
towards a military spectrum approach, in which peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement are part of a range of military options. Hitherto, 1Yider 
Peacekeeping, the US FM 100-23, the December 1995 NATO Doctrinefor 
Peace Support Operations and the UN' s own pronouncements, had not 
proposed using the same forces for sliding from peacekeeping to 
enforcement and back again. In spite of the confusingly varied 
nomenclature used by different states for peace support operations, they 
had commonly articulated a distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. 15 However, France, the largest and most active European 
peacekeeper by 1992 and a leading supporter of strengthening the UN and 
European security orders, was developing a less conservative approach. 
The French General Staff noted a requirement to act under a Chapter VII 
mandate in a "no consent, no aggressor" context, in order to restore peace 
(restauration de la paix). This would be non-offensive interpositional 
peacekeeping in an internaf conflict but, and on this point France was 
exceptional at the time 1 with a mandate to switch to overwhelming force if 
necessary against all-corners who disturbed the peace. It differed from 
peace enforcement, which is also action under Chapter VII, in that peace 
enforcement, according to the French view, crossed the boundary into 
war. 16 The defining peace restoration mission for France was Operation 
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Turquoise in R wanda in mid-1994 which established a protection zone in 
the south-west of the country. Of course, in this instance the potential 
chal1engers did not possess powerful or sophisticated military equipment 
on the same level as, say, the Bosnian Serb forces in former Yugoslavia. 
Nevertheless, the UK had the distinct advantage of a more widely-
understood language and a field manual that received public exposure and 
was eventually published as U'ider Peacekeeping by the Stationery Office 
in London. lt is also clear that the UK took a lead in developing a revisionist 
approach to its own Wider Peacekeeping doctrine. The UK 's first draft of 
AFM PSO indicates a major doctrinal shift to a spectrum discourse, rather 
than representing an up-dating or consolidation of the former doctrine. 
It also meshes with advances in the militarisation of peacekeeping in 
three respects. First, the 1990s have seen a more military, professional 
approach to peacekeeping management by the UN, as evidenced by various 
reforms in the DPKO: establishing a round-the-clock Situation Centre, 
increasing the staff from 6 in 1989 to about 450 in 1996, estab1ishing an 
equipment maintenance and assembly store in Brindisi and so forth. 
Second! the concept of the UN subcontracting to proficient coalitions of 
the willing and able has been established for peace enforcement operations. 
Third, whereas there was no real doctrine of peacekeeping beyond the 
Hammarskjold principles during the Cold War, there were more insistent 
calls for a military doctrine of peacekeeping in the early 1990s. The 
requirement for a post.:cold war doctrine had been answered by the British 
Army,s ~Vider Peacekeeping manual. Since then, the revision of British 
Army doctrine recognises that the principles of war can be adapted to 
peace support operations and that enforcement "is set to increase" as the 
most appropriate response in complex emergencies where the situation in 
volatile. 17 
This is not to say that cold war peacekeeping was entirely devoid of 
military professionalism. The British Army in Cyprus, for example, was 
highly professional in its approach. But peacekeeping was hardly treated 
seriously in the UK until the production of the Army Field AtJanual: Peace 
Keeping Operations in 1988, and the subject was not taught at the Royal 
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Military Academy, Sandhurst until 1994. There can be little doubt that, 
since the end of the cold war, far more attention has been paid within the 
UK, the UN and among contributing states to the need for high levels of 
military professionalism and competence for peace support operations. 
Above all, the new doctrine reflects a decision to deliberately 
incorporate the possibilities of vertical creep in operations in a controlled 
way and not assume that peacekeepers are appropriate in volatile situations. 
Indeed the reliance by blue helmet forces on consent can lead opponents to 
see this as a weakness from which to take advantage, thereby underlining a 
cringe posture on the part of the peacekeepers. 18 
Correspondingly, horizontal creep may have to be dealt with by 
emphasising the distance between military and non-military tasks. One 
should not overstate the case here. The military priority is bound to prevail 
in the military mind. But the more peacekeeping is seen as being a military 
rather than diplomatic function the less room there may be for horizontal 
activities. A reciprocal relationship between the two kinds of overspi11 
probably involves an element of mutual exclusion to the extent that the 
incorporation of escalation creep may preclude the incorporation of 
horizontal creep. Not surprisingly, therefore., advocates of escalation 
potential have also been vociferous against task creep. 19 lndeed1 Wider 
Peacekeeping suggested that transiting to peace enforcement: 
would, for instance, require substantia/force restructuring and 
redeployment, the evacuation of unarmed monitors and civilian workers 
and the probable termination of humanitarian operations. 20 
The logic of military preferences results in stones being cast in one pool 
rather than another, and the rationality of the choice for military 
establishments can hardly be denied. They are choosing to deal with 
vertical mission creep by trying to eliminate its inadvertence and making it 
intentional. This institutionalises it as part of a military spectrum) and it 
clearly has a combat-oriented ontology which challenges the diplomatic 
basis of old peacekeeping and even wider peacekeeping. 21 This is not the 
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same as a continuum, or seamless transition from one kind of operation to 
another. Rather, the spectrum is segmented. Although a likely consequence 
of loss of credibility in a peacekeeping force is withdrawal, a transition 
from one segment to another is certainly envisaged: ··A PK [peacekeeping] 
force can make the transition to PE [peace enforcement] provided that the 
necessary preparations [restructuring, evacuation of civi I ians and 
termination ofhumanitarian activities] have previously been made."22 
The Hammarsjkold principles, The Nordic Tactical Manual, Wider 
Peacekeeping and F.Nf 100-23 made austere distinctions between 
peacekeeping and enforcement and emphasised the break between 
relatively inoffensive and relatively combative configurations. In December 
1995 NATO doctrine also stated that: 
Peace enforcement is fundamentally different from peacekeeping and 
requires a conscioUs political decision and a clear UN Mandate. It is 
normally not possible/or the same PSF [Peace Support Force] Jo ntove 
from one operation to the other, unless this possibility was foreseen and 
planned for; there are fundamental differences in the required 
organisation, training, attitudes, and equipment between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement forces. 13 
By contrast, the emerging peace support operations doctrine allows 
planning for moving from one type of operation to another in a controlled 
way with escalation dominance. In essence, the problem of mission creep 
is solved by controlling it. New distinctions are made between peace 
enforcement and war. Unlike warfare, peace enforcement operates within 
strict limits such as impartiality in the targets of enforcement, minimum 
use of force consistent with the task and the preclusion of ~'war winning" 
objectives.24 Neverthel_ess, peace support operations can become part of 
proper soldiering rather than a distraction or a bJack art. Hammarskjold's 
rubric that "peacekeeping is not soldiers., work but only soldiers can do itn, 
is translated into '"peace support is soldier's work and only soldier's can do 
it". 
DEFENCE STUDIES 2/1997 1 5 
The adoption of an approach based on continuity rather than disjunction in 
military behaviour perhaps offers a more consistent and comfortable 
framework for military establishments, or at least for certain military cultures, 
than does the old discontinuity in military behaviour that peacekeeping always 
presented. As the new British doctrine comments in regard to training: 
The conduct of P K [peacekeeping] may limit the use of force to self 
defence purposes, however, there may be the requirement; in the conduct 
of any operation, to escalate to enforcement and war fighting. 15 
The doctrine shift is designed to offer a better fit between requirements, 
intentions and performance. Important military questions arise frotn new 
peace support doctrine- whether transitions are to be stepped or smooth; if, 
when and how helmets are to be changed from blue to green; whether it is 
more logical to provide a third force for third options. In theory, switching 
between roles, from the modestly-anned and transparent peacekeeper to the 
camouflaged combat soldier may not be a mission impossible. In carefully 
controlled domestic. environments and schedules, soldiers can switch from 
warfighting roles to disaster relief for the civil power and back again. Needless 
to say, intrastate conflicts are not carefully controlled environments. However, 
the impact on military effectiveness is not the point at issue in this paper, but 
the non-military implications of the new doctrine. 
Non-military Implications of the Doctrine Shift 
Among the important considerations that will impinge on peace support 
operations, five can be readily identified. 
Constitutional issues 
The legal basis for moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement 
operations, and the closely-related issue of subcontracting, raises serious 
constitutional points. The use of Chapter VII for enforcement activities by 
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UNLKOM, UNISOM 11 and, eventually, by UNPROFOR was perfectly 
legitimate (coming close to the original purpose of article 43). Consensual 
peacekeeping~ despite lack of express provision in the UN Charter, also has 
a firm legaf basis. ln effect, UN authorisation is not even required for states 
or groups of states to conduct it. However, delegated enforcement action 
does require Security Council authorisation (under article 53). The legal 
status of operations that transit from peacekeeping to enforcement is 
therefore uncertain. There is no provision for an operation that commences 
as a consent-based presence, without the need of UN authorisation, and 
then~ in accordance with new doctrine, develops into a grey-area of 
enforcement whilst maintaining a peacekeeping label outside article 53. 
What has tended to happen is that the Security Council has given its 
imprimatur to a regional 'peacekeeping operation' after it has commenced 
(as in Chad and Liberia), but then turned a blind eye to its subsequent 
evolution as an enforcement operation. 
Such looseness is dangerous. It allows "considerable coercive freedom 
for regional defence and security organisations, which are, as practice has 
shown, subject to even greater domination and abuse" than UN 
operations. 26 Further, as David Gibbs points out~ it is possible that such 
franchised operations could constitute "a new means for established 
powers to project their influence or, stated more plainly, a new type of 
imperialism."27 Consequently, the value of having the participation of the 
Permanent Five Security Council members in Chapter Vl consensual 
peacekeeping is open to question. A study by IN CORE (Initiative on 
Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, University of Ulster) already suggests 
that the PS might be excluded on the grounds that they are perceived to be 
overtly following national interests.28 One solution is the subsidisation by 
the wealthier states of regional institutions and states for peacekeeping, 
thereby also avoiding the human and economic costs of involvement in 
conflicts deemed of peripheral interest to the wealthy -much as the United 
.. 
Kingdom and France are subsidising African peacekeeping competence. In 
the short term, however, this is likeJy to increase dependency on western 
equipment, expertise and logistic support.29 
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On the other hand, for the UN to assume control over enforcement or 
"grey area" operations is not necessarily desirable. If constitutional controls 
over peace enforcement are desirable~ "to help prevent charges of western 
domination [ ... ] as well as curbing excessive uses of force'~30 the exercise 
of control might, in turn, endanger the UN's credibility and neutrality. It 
could undermine the UN Secretary-General's authority as an impartial 
negotiator. In sum, without secure constitutional foundations for "grey 
area" operations, intervention by the most powerful states, either controlled 
or uncontrolled, could undermine the UN's legitimating function. 
Political Acceptability 
The political acceptability of a military spectrum. in which vertica1 mission 
creep is deliberately embraced may not be acceptable to troop providers 
taking risks and for those being policed or protected whose future co-
operation may be jeopardised. The shift in doctrine eclipses the former 
consensus around traditional guidelines. It is quite possible that the ne\v 
doctrine wilJ be universally-accepted to produce a new doctrinal 
consensus. However, the consensus may not be so robust and long-lasting 
as the previous Hammarskjold consensus for two reasons. 
First, change in the environment of peacekeeping has been so rapid that 
doctrine has difficulty keeping up with practice. It is a central paradox of 
doctrinal development that the demand for consistent guidance is greater at 
a time when the pace of change has made it more difficult to discern 
dominant trends and more problematic to devise new, lasting principles. As 
in general warfare, the military establishments always seem to be reacting 
to and preparing for the previous crisis. 
The experience of Somalia engendered great caution about mixing 
traditional peacekeeping and enforcement. The Rwanda crisis suggested 
the need for robust restauration de /apaL"C by well-armed, though relatively 
smaJI, and rapidly-deployed forces. The UNPROFOR mission in former 
Yugoslavia initially appeared to confirm the need for separation of 
peacekeeping and combat functions, because the Security Council had 
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disastrously fudged the two concepts, and the IFOR mission subsequently 
encouraged a military spectrum approach. The Great Lakes crisis (Zaire, 
Burundi, Rwanda) in the latter part of 1996 testified to the great muddle 
that seemed to prevail. For it was not at all clear what an external force 
would do in that region, how it would be configured and what its rules of 
engagement would be. 
Second, Hammarskjold's principles were relatively uncontroversial 
because they were based on limited, consent-based inter-state 
peacekeeping. The character of new peace support operations is riskier, 
and this may discourage states from subscribing, though qualms may be 
suppressed if escalation is anticipated rather than inadvertent.31 So far, 
among the Nordic states, Denmark has subscribed to NATO peace support 
operations doctrine (and its tank company in UNPROFOR shelled and 
killed Bosnian Serbs when returning harassing fire). Sweden and Finland 
were also involved in IFOR, though the former is guided by a doctrine 
similar to wider peacekeeping called "extended multi functional 
peacekeeping", and the latter has constitutional inhibitions on involvement 
in enforcement.32 However, if casualties are suffered as a consequence of 
association with a military spectrum approach, and another incident occurs 
of the kind that affected the second Multinational Force in Beirut in 1982, 
then the attitude of these and other states may change. 
Exclusion on Military Grounds 
The new doctrine portends a growing gap between military efficiency and 
political representation. It entails a high level of military proficiency on the 
part of contributing forces. In peace support operations that could entail 
enforcement, military protection of the force is paramount. Consequently, 
there is no room for incompetent and fainthearted military components in a 
force. High levels of professionalism and capability are required. Advocates 
of peacekeeping reform have correctly anticipated pressures for 
standardisation in training and harmonisation of operating procedures. The 
United States appears to be taking a leading position on training, and there 
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are recommendations that criteria, to which some Third World states are 
unlikely to conform, should determine the suitability of contributions to 
peacekeeping by other states.JJ It would also be logical to create an 
international inspectorate to reject troops from countries that do not meet 
rigorous combat requirements. 
However, these criteria will have consequences in terms of 
representation and political legitimacy, because selected multinational forces 
are likely to be drawn from a limited number of capable states. It may be 
essential, then, to spend as much effort in improving the competence of 
unrepresented states as in refining the peace support doctrine of hegemonic 
states. 
Division of labour 
The new doctrine for peace support operations subscribes to a ""division of 
labour" approach. This is designed to exploit the comparative advantage of 
types of specialisation. At the same time, several studies suggest that 
because complex situations require complex answers, a holistic approach 
to peacekeeping and external involvement has to be adopted. Both the 
Canadian and Dutch studies into improving rapid response acknowledged 
that peacekeeping was less a purely military vocation than in the past.14 The 
INCORE study places considerable emphasis on a holistic approach to 
military training, going beyond military skills and in effect incorporating 
multifunctional task creep. 35 
The two approaches, the holistic and the division of labour, are not 
necessarily incompatible. But the militarisation of peacekeeping could well 
make it increasingly difficult to mesh with civilian aspects of operations, 
especially in the military guardianship of civilian humanitarian activities.36 
The military will not wish to be hampered by civilian tasks; the 
humanitarian agencies do not want to be tarred with the military brush. A 
divorce between military and civilian components, to the detriment of the 
latter in the implem_entation of the Dayton Agreement has been a 
consequence of the division of labour approach.37 
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British Army doctrine emphasises the need for coordination of effort 
through a campaign plan developed by a Head of Mission, normally the UN 
Secretary-General's Special Representative.38 But managing the plan, and 
particularly the relationship between military-civilian components, is likely 
to be increasingly demanding if divisions of labour leads to specialist 
autonomies and greater prospect of the use of force. One particular 
European government's defence ministry has adopted the military spectrum 
approach for peace support measures whilst another of its ministries 
(meshing the management of negotiations. sanctions and conflict 
prevention with humanitarian relief) is heading in the opposite direction.]') 
Consequently, when the two impinge upon one another their working 
relationships have to converge from goals and methods that may be drifting 
further apart. 
Given that the multiplicity of actors in complex emergencies are likely 
to resist coordination and attempt to maintain their independence, the best 
that can be hoped for is probably the facilitation of cooperation to concert 
military civilian efforts and avoid duplication. A logical consequence of 
increased division of labour in external intervention would be to create a 
body of professional coordinators/faciJitators- though they might function 
by uniting all the other actors in distrust of this new layer of international 
bureaucracy !40 
Simultaneously, powerful market imperatives to exploit comparative 
advantage are pushing military establishments with volunteer forces 
towards internal, marketised divisions of labour. Economic imperatives are 
increasing the civilianisation of support functions. In the United States, for 
example, where the culture of market testing and contractorisation has 
gone furthest, the out-sourcing of base installation and management has 
been partly justified on the grounds that it is a waste of talent for soldiers 
to be digging latrines, especially in conflict situations. Manpower cost 
savings in the order of 25 per cent can be made. Increased militarisation of 
field operations will necessitate a rigid division oftabour that may become 
problematic in conflict. Will soldiers be obliged to protect and rescue 
private company personnel? What will be the status of these personnel 
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under international law? What control will commanders have over them? 
Will they be subject to military discipline? These and a great many other 
related questions, and the military consequences of the market in peace 
support operations, need to be given thorough consideration.41 
The Challenge of Divergent Perceptions 
As Hugo Slim has indicated, the military and civilian cultures in external 
interventions possess certain similarities and exhibit a "peculiar mimicry", 
but they also have crucial differences. 42 Civilians working in complex 
emergencies are not themselves homogenous, of course, but they share 
features that distinguish them from the military: often a profound unease 
about military ethics and culture, a gender balance not seen in the military, 
and a greater degree of accountability to their host communities. The new 
military doctrine may widen the distance between military and civilian 
because of its emphasis on the division of labour approach. 
Furthermore, although both military and non-military commentators 
share the perception that conflict environments are grey and messy, 
locating peace support operations on a spectrum of force could, even 
unintentionally, encourage the notion that there can be military fixes of 
deep-rooted political problems, a notion that may be exacerbated by the 
pressure for quick exit strategies. It is worth emphasising that concerns 
about grey area operations cannot be dismissed as a case of "academics" 
wishing the world were a less messy place. On the contrary, an 
appreciation that situations are messy and volatile, leads to a concern that 
interventions do not create more mess in the long term. 
Humanitarian workers and political negotiators have to deal with the 
situations after the military have gone. This is one of the reasons why, in 
general, UN officials have recoiled from the view that peacekeeping can be 
extended in an escalatory fashion, even if it seems to Jimit flexibility both 
before commitment and in the field. For example, Marrack Goulding, 
former Under Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations and 
subsequently for Political A trairs, argued for strict conditions for the use 
22 D~f'ENCESTUOIES 2/19;!7 
of force by the UN, conditions perhaps unlikely to be fulfilled, though not 
as part of a military spectrum and not necessarily undertaken by 
peacekeepers:13 The new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, however, 
may be more favourable to extending the use of coercion into what he calls 
inducement. This departure from the principle of host consent, would be 
limited to situations where peacekeepers might take coercive action, used 
impartially, in response to breaches of undertakings that factions have 
made.44 
Conclusion 
The fonnulation of principles and doctrine for peacekeeping has, of 
course, lagged behind developments in practice. Indeed third party 
operations occurred in Europe as a crisis management instrument after the 
First World War (in the Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite, for example), long 
before the term ~'peacekeeping" was coined, and without any apparent need 
to define criteria. During the cold war, the basic principles were effectively 
institutionalised by experience in a relatively settled international system. 
But during the cold war the restricted use of peacekeeping and the 
restricted range of states participating in the mainly uncontested 
interventions, meant that the principles, though paradoxically unmilitary in 
character, could be relatively uncontroversial and readily subscribed to by 
participants. For some forty years there was little political debate about the 
general function ofpeacekeepers and the principles they should follow, 
though the Congo crisis was a significant exception. 
Since 1989, the demand for new doctrine has followed the rapidly 
changing demands for _new peacekeeping. The British Anny provided a 
model for post-cold war doctrine in Wider Peacekeeping that was ''wide" 
in its acceptance, perhaps because it was based on the old discourse that 
peacekeeping was not soldiers, work, but an extension of diplomacy in 
fragile peace. Whether the doctrine of peace support operations can be 
sustained militarily and politicaiJy will depend on its relevance to future 
crises, for military doctrine has always trailed behind experience. Just as 
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generals are condemned to fight the next war according to what they 
should have done in the previous conflict, the same will be true of peace 
support operations. The difficulty will be lessened if doctrine draws on 
cumulative experience rather than simply reacting to the lessons of the 
most recent intervention. 
Now, more than in consensual operations, the new peace support 
operations carry great burdens of expectation to uphold normative 
humanitarian principles and a multinational cooperative spirit. But it has to 
be remembered that peace support operations reflect failures in world 
politics. They attempt to deal with the manifestations of problems rather 
than the problems themselves. That the new circumstances of international 
peacekeeping require new doctrine is a convincing, legitimate and powerful 
thesis. However, as doctrine writers themselves no doubt appreciate, 
guidelines are not a panacea and we need to be aware of the non-military 
implications of escaping from the snake by climbing the ladder. 
Disassociation from the old discourse, insularity from civilian and conflict 
resolution functions and increased emphasis on combat capability can 
serve to protect military establishments from the horrors of missions 
impossible. But it is unlikely to overcome the political deficiencies of 
mission cringe. As Shashi Tharoor has remarked, it is essential to do the 
right thing as well as do the thing right.45 
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